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Starting from the theories of leading psychiatrists, like Kraepelin and de Clérambault,
the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) formulated an original theory
of psychosis, focusing on the subject and on the structuring role of language. In
particular, he postulated that language makes up the experience of subjectivity and that
psychosis is marked by the absence of a crucial metaphorization process. Interestingly,
in contemporary psychiatry there is growing empirical evidence that schizophrenia is
characterized by abnormal interpretation of verbal and non-verbal information, with
a great difficulty to put such information in the appropriate context. Neuro-scientific
contributions have investigated this difficulty suggesting the possibility of interpreting
schizophrenia as a semiotic disorder which makes the patients incapable of understand-
ing the figurative meaning of the metaphoric speech, probably due to a dysfunction
of certain right hemisphere areas, such as the right temporoparietal junction and the
right superior/middle temporal gyrus. In this paper we first review the Lacanian theory
of psychosis and neuro-scientific research in the field of symbolization and metaphoric
speech. Next, we discuss possible convergences between both approaches, exploring
how they might join and inspire one another. Clinical and neurophysiological research
implications are discussed.
Keywords: schizophrenia, psychoanalysis, right hemisphere, psychosis, symbolization, metaphor, concretism,
Lacan
Introduction
Seminal descriptions of schizophrenia stress that next to symptoms like hallucinations and delusions,
remarkable alterations can be observed in patients’ mental life. For example, concerning dementia
praecox Kraepelin (1913, p. 3) accentuated a “peculiar destruction of the internal connections
of the psychic personality,” as a result of which emotional and volitional aspects of mental life
get deregulated. Bleuler (1934), for his part, stressed that disturbances of association make up an
especially important basic symptom, and indicated that these result in the loss of formal coherence
of speech and in disconnected thinking. Since Kraepelin and Bleuler, many authors have tried to
characterize the “core feature” of schizophrenia, on which all the symptoms depend. For example,
Parnas (2011) suggested that it is marked by autism, i.e., a change in the structures of subjectivity,
anomalies of self-experience, disturbed relations to the world, solipsism and isolation. Others have
speculated that a pivotal role may be played by negative symptoms or by neurocognitive deficits
(Remington et al., 2011).
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A prominent yet underestimated symptom of schizophrenia
is the peculiar interpretation and processing of verbal and non-
verbal information, with a great difficulty of patients to put these
in the appropriate context. Some authors have investigated this
difficulty suggesting the possibility of interpreting schizophre-
nia as a semiotic disorder, which disables patients ability to
understand the figurativemeaning ofmetaphoric speech (Harrod,
1986). Next to that, psychoanalytic authors, like Jacques Lacan,
have suggested that psychosis may be explained in terms of a
problem at the level of subjective representation by means of
language, which led him to stress a fundamental problem at the
level of metaphor use.
This paper has a double focus. On the one hand we dis-
cuss Jacques Lacan’s thesis concerning the structure that under-
lies psychotic functioning. Lacan starts from a unified psy-
chosis concept, in which different forms of psychosis, like
schizophrenia and paranoia are considered to be related to a
central problem of metaphor use at the level of subjectivity.
On the other hand we discuss neuro-scientific literature con-
cerning the right hemisphere-dependent impairment in pro-
cessing metaphoric speech, which characterizes schizophrenia,
and highlight the roles of symbolization and metaphor com-
prehension in the development of psychotic symptoms. In a
final step we explore how both approaches might converge and
inspire one another. We will start with a broad contextualiza-
tion of Lacan’s work, bringing us to his concept of the divided
subject.
Lacan on Psychosis
French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s oeuvre covers a period of
over 50 years, during which time he developed a theory that
innovated psychoanalytic practice and introduced a new method
of reflecting on human subjectivity.
Lacan’s work is often divided into three periods: the Imag-
inary (1936–1952), the Symbolic (1953–1962), and the Real
(1963–1981), as he reported in the Seminar R.S.I. (1974–1975):
“I began with the Imaginary, I then had to chew on the story
of the Symbolic [: : :] and I finished by putting out for you this
famous Real.” The Symbolic is the register of symbolic language,
the signifying chain of words, while the Imaginary is related to
the image of each individual as an object in the mirror, and to
the image one has of others. Normally, all perception is filtered
through the registers of the Imaginary and the Symbolic. On the
contrary, the Real is “the thing in itself,” it is the un-Imaginable
and un-Symbolizable.
While most of Lacan’s work is not specifically concerned with
psychosis, the question of psychosis was addressed in various
papers and during several seminars held between the early 1950s
and the late 1970s. During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries psychosis was largely understood in terms of organic
deficiencies: psychotic symptoms were seen as a surface phenom-
ena of presumed underlying disturbances in the brain. While
Lacan was interested in the strict neurobiological work of his
forbearers, particularly because of their detailed observation of
psychotic patients’ functioning, he believed that these theories
overlooked the complexity of the psychotic experience. A main
issue that remained neglected was the question as to how psy-
chosis is intertwined with subjectivity.
Four periods can be discerned in Lacan’s work on psychosis
(Vanheule, 2011). These periods are not strictly separated, but
such a distinction helps us grasp the different emphasis Lacan put
on different concepts across time.
The first period concerns Lacan’s work in the 1930s and 1940s,
and focuses on identification. At that moment Lacan brings psy-
choanalysis into dialog with theories of leading psychiatrists, like
Kraepelin and Jaspers, and gradually differentiates the psycho-
analytic perspective from the psychiatric one. He proposes that
psychosis is characterized by a specific type of identification: the
ego is captured by an ideal image, from which it is not well
differentiated. This results in confusion and suspicion.
In the 1950s (second period) he puts this view aside, contending
thatwhatmatters in psychoanalysis is themateriality of speech.He
then argues that language makes up the experience of subjectivity
and that psychosis is marked by a deficiency in certain metaphor
uses. Central to this period is his year-long seminar on psychosis
(Seminar III; Lacan, 1955–1956), which gave rise to the text On
a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis (Lacan,
1959–2006). During this time Lacan provided his most exten-
sive discussion of the topic of psychosis, proving himself a truly
innovative thinker. His re-interpretation, or “structural analysis”
(Lacan, 1959–2006, p. 449), of Schreber’s (1955) autobiography is
crucial in this phase of his work.
However, as his seminar progressed Lacan revised these ideas
twice. From his 10th seminar onward (1962–1963; third period),
Lacan stressed that psychosis also entails a different experience
of corporeality and a different relation to the libidinous drive.
He then embraces the thesis that some aspects of being cannot
be grasped via language. The two key-concepts used to address
this domain of being are “jouissance” and the “object a.” The
fourth era in Lacan’s work on psychosis gravitates around his
23rd seminar (Lacan, 1975–1976) where knot theory is used to
operationalize mental functioning. The central question he then
works with concerns how a link can be made in the relation
between the three registers that make up mental life: the Real, the
Symbolic and the Imaginary.
While Lacan’s work from the 1960s and 1970s adds impor-
tant aspects to his psychosis theory, his ideas of the 1950s are
usually seen as truly groundbreaking (Nobus, 2000; Fink, 2007).
Inspired by the structural linguistic works of de Saussure (1916),
Benveniste (1966), and Jakobson (1971–1985) he then respectively
pays attention to the role and function of signifiers, pronouns and
metaphors in psychosis. At the same time Lacan starts rebelling
against mainstream psychodynamic interpretations of psychosis,
which focus too strongly on intrapsychic disturbances.
Language and the Subject
Guided by a return to the work of Freud, in the 1950s Lacan
proposed that Freud’s ideas on the functioning of the unconscious,
and more broadly of mental life, can be better understood within
the context of linguistic theory: desire is structured by language
and expressed in speech (Lacan, 1953). From this perspective, the
unconscious is made up of so-called signifiers, which, following
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 6642
Ribolsi et al. Metaphor in psychosis
de Saussure (1916) and Lacan (1957–2006) considers as the most
elementary units of language. Indeed, just like de Saussure, Lacan
makes a distinction between signifier and signified. The signified
concerns the concept or the idea that the linguistic sign conveys,
while the signifier refers to the “acoustic image” or the “sound
image” that makes up the sign (de Saussure, 1916, p. 66). In the
processes of speech andwriting, signifiers are related to signifieds,
which results in the creation of signification: “A signifying unit
presupposes the completion of a certain circle that situates its
different elements [signifier and signified]” (Lacan, 1955–1956, p.
263).
de Saussure (1916) proposes that in human language use of
the signified predominates over the signifier. This accent on the
concept or the idea assumes that language is used to transfer
and express meaning. Lacan (1957–2006), by contrast, clearly
argues for the opposite, and considers the signifier as primordial
to the signified. He argues that at the level of the unconscious,
the signifier predominates and even makes up the logic of how
symptoms are organized.
Another idea Lacan adopts from de Saussure (1916) is that
the moment language is used in speech signifiers are linked in
signifier-to-signifier connections or chains. Signifiers connect in
“signifying chains” says Lacan (1957–2006, p. 418), like links in
a necklace. Both Roman Jakobson and Lacan follow de Saussure
in this idea. Jakobson (1953–1971, p. 565) concludes that the
principle of connecting signifiersmakes up the syntagmatic axis in
language: “syntax is concernedwith the axis of concatenation.” In a
broader time frame these signifying chains make up the diachrony
of language. This means that by linking signifiers in linear chains
the dimension of time is introduced. On the one hand adding a
new signifier implies that preceding signifiers obtain a status of
anteriority. On the other hand the linear connection of signifiers
in speech is open-ended and leads to the anticipation of additional
signifiers. The articulation of each signifier sets up the expectation
of yet another signifier that will further complement the chain.
Next to the syntagmatic or diachronic dimension in language,
de Saussure and Jakobson also distinguish a so-called associative
or synchronic axis. Jakobson (1953–1971) refers to this as the
dimension of synchrony, which he opposed to diachrony. Syn-
chrony means that when a signifier is diachronically chained in
speech, it simultaneously echoesmany other signifiers that are not
actually articulated, but are connected to it associatively.
Furthermore, Jakobson (1953–1971)1 connects diachrony and
synchrony to two characteristic figures of speech: metaphoric
substitution takes places at the level of synchrony, and diachrony
is most characteristic of metonymy. Lacan (1957–2006) especially
1Jakobson (1953–1971) connects the synchrony and diachrony to two types of
aphasia, which might be the result of a stroke. The first type is the similarity
disorder, in which patients experience problems selecting the right word for
naming events or objects. This aphasia is characterized by a substitution
deficiency and implies thatmetaphoric processes are affected. The second type
is the contiguity disorder. This time the patient loses the capacity to combine
linguistic elements, hence the idea that metonymy is deficient. In his year-
long seminar on psychosis [Lacan (1955–1956)] discussed Jakobson’s work on
aphasia, but never connected it to further speculation onmechanisms involved
in aphasia. What he focused on was howmetonymy andmetaphor function in
psychosis.
FIGURE 1 | The logic of signification.
focused on these processes of metaphor and metonymy, suggest-
ing that they correspondwith condensation and displacement, the
two main processes Freud discerned at the level of the uncon-
scious. Condensation is understood in terms of the metaphoric
process, and displacement in terms of metonymy (Vanheule,
2011).
With the concepts of diachrony and synchrony the process of
signification is also specified (Van Haute, 2001; Naveau, 2004).
Signification is not merely an effect of linking signifiers to sig-
nifieds, but is created as an effect of syntactic processes in the
signifying chain. Figure 1 illustrates Lacan’s understanding of
how the logic of signification is generated in language (Lacan,
1957–1958, 1960–2006; see also “Graph I” in Lacan, 1960–2006,
p. 681).
In Figure 1, the horizontal arrow from S to S0 indicates how,
on the one hand, speech is always a matter of linking signifiers in
a chain; a metonymic process that temporally follows diachronic
logic. On the other hand, speech will only be generated if a person
feels the urge to articulate an intention or need, symbolized by
at the basis of the returning arrow. The returning arrow indicates
how this intention eventually leads to the production of meaning
and subjectivity. The two intersections between the arrows are
thereby crucial.
The right intersection (indicated as O) refers to the Other or
“the locus of the treasure trove of signifiers” (Lacan, 1960–2006,
p. 682), and indicates that in the production of speech, signifiers
are picked up from the lexicon we have at our disposal. The
idea of treasure trove thereby expresses synchrony: in the Sym-
bolic all signifiers are simultaneously given. A speaker picks up
elements from this whole and links them in a chain. By doing
so the anticipation of meaning begins. Indeed, through the use
of signifiers, an idea is expected to arise. Yet as long as the
advent of ameaning is under construction, it is suspended (Lacan,
1959–2006, p. 446).
The left intersection refers to the moment in which the inten-
tion to speak eventually crystallizes in signification; in a message,
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indicated as s(O) in the figure above. Lacan stresses that, at a
temporal level, punctuation follows a retroactive logic. It is only
if a sufficient number of signifiers have been articulated that
meaning can arise. Signifiers that are articulated later will thereby
determine the final meaning of formerly uttered signifiers.
Finally, and most importantly, the process of generating mean-
ing also has the effect of producing subjectivity: via language use
the subject takes shape, indicated as $ in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows
that whereas Lacan frequently made use of linguistic concepts,
his primary aim is clinical and directed toward insight into how
subjectivity is generated via the use of signifiers. In this respect
personal pronouns occupy an important role. Because of our use
of personal pronouns speech turns into a self-referential process:
as we speak we outline who we are. However, the signifiers artic-
ulated in the signifying chain mark and connote the speaker, but
never denote the speaker exactly. Lacan considers the subject as
an effect of this connotation and thus concludes that the subject
is only half-said, which is expressed by the bar through S in the
symbol for the subject: $. In terms of the process of significa-
tion, $ is the result of a dialectical tension. At the level of the
message, speech functions to build images regarding who we are.
These images make up the ego, but are selective imaginary self-
representations that exclude certain signifiers. The unconscious
subject consists of these “forgotten” signifiers, across which the
subject is fundamentally scattered; hence the idea that the sub-
ject is divided (Lacan, 1957–1958, 1960–2006). In neurosis this
division is experienced as internal, hence the neurotic tendency
to repress, whereas in psychosis it is experienced as disconnected
from one’s own intentions and as coming from without.
Metaphorization in Psychosis
Following his discussion on the divided subject and the signifier,
Lacan examined the structure of psychosis. He suggests that in
psychosis a specific signifier, which concerns both the law and
naming, is absent and, as a result, the structure of the Symbolic
is unstable. He calls this signifier the “Name-of-the-Father,” and
refers to its absencewith the concept of “foreclosure.” Both of these
concepts were introduced during his discussion of Freud’s Oedi-
pus complex. On the one hand Lacan considered Freud’s account
of the Oedipus complex as important for characterizing the struc-
ture of psychopathology. On the other hand he believed it gave
too mythical account of this transition. Whereas Freud mainly
described the Oedipus complex in developmental terms, Lacan
(1959–2006) believes that what actually takes place is a metaphor-
ical transition. In his interpretation a special signifier is installed
during the Oedipus complex: the paternal signifier or Name-
of-the-Father. This signifier nominates the desire of the maternal
figure with which the child is first confronted, and it opens up the
dimension of the law. Through the Name-of-the-Father people
understand themselves and others in terms of rules and standards
that one should obey. They use this signifier to make sense of
desire and it helps them to experience permanency in social
relations.
Roman Jakobson was a crucial source of inspiration for Lacan’s
theory of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. It is via
Jakobson, Lacan became interested in the structure of metaphor.
Actually, Jakobson extensively discussed two linguistic tropes:
metonymy and metaphor.
Metonymy takes place within the diachronic linking of signi-
fiers in a chain, where one signifier evokes another because of
a thematic connection at the level of the signified. For example,
in the phrase: “I sent her an e-mail.” The words “sent” and
“e-mail” are thematically related and are connected in a relation of
continuation. A characteristic of metonymy is that the signifieds
communicated are in line with each other and provide a coherent
context. Such thematic connection entails a mental experience of
continuity. Indeed, a sense of continuity is experienced because
we produce ideas that are thematically linked. Throughmetonymy
the speaking subject is connoted: As we integrate personal pro-
nouns like “I” and “her” in our speech, metonymy presents the
subject, without actually defining who the subject is.
Metaphor is different. Jakobson (1953–1971) explained
metaphor as a process at the level of synchrony, in which one
signifier is replaced by another based on similarity. Overall,
Lacan follows Jakobson’s idea, and formalizes it as follows (Lacan,
1959–2006, p. 464):
The formula indicates that metaphor is a process in the signi-
fying chain, indicated by the dot between the two fractions in the
left section of the formula, in which a signifier S replaces another
signifier that was not uttered but was metonymically anticipated
in the signifying chain, expressed by the barred S0. The x from the
formula symbolizes metonymic anticipation of signification. The
signifier S that is actually produced in a metaphor is surprising in
a given speech context, and disrupts themetonymic process: at the
level of the signified metaphors produce discontinuity. Metaphors
create shifts in meaning, and add new ideas to a line of reasoning.
Indeed, the effect of a metaphoric substitution between signifiers
is an induction of meaning (see Lacan, 1959–2006, p. 465). In this
formula the symbol “I” represents the “impact of the signifier on
the signified” (Lacan, 1957–1958, p. 428), and “s” refers to the
signified on which an influence is exercised2.
Just like metonymy, for Lacan metaphor is not simply a lin-
guistic trope, but a mode of speech along which the subject is
defined. The effect of metaphor is such that the subject, which
2For example, in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus Saturninus, the new emperor
of Rome, suggests that the heroic general Titus Andronicus is involved in the
kidnapping of his own daughter, Lavinia. Titus is shocked by Saturninus’ accu-
sation and cries out loud: “These words are razors to my wounded heart” (Act
1, Scene A, Verse 314). This sentence is a metaphor. By saying that Saturninus’
words are razors, the material qualities usually attributed to this object (e.g.,
“sharp,” “cuts,” and “wounds if not handled carefully”) are transferred to the
concept “words.” Often, words are seen as ephemeral communications with
no real impact on life. When Titus Andronicus says that they are razors, the
opposite gets communicated: a fearless warrior like him does not get wounded
by the swords and knives of his enemies, but by the false accusations of
the man he fully trusted. As reader of the play we anticipate that following
Saturninus’ accusation, anger and disappointment will be expressed. However,
Titus Andronicus does not simply indicate that he is angry or shocked by
Saturninus’ words (the barred S’ in the formula of metaphor), but says that
words are wounding razors (S in the formula of metaphor), which implies that
a physical quality is attributed to Saturninus’ words.
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was connoted until then, is denoted and identified. At the level
of meaning, a metaphor attributes predicates or characteristics to
the subject, and tells us something about the identity of the person
that is presented via speech.
As indicated, Lacan suggests that the structure underlying
the Oedipus complex concerns a process of metaphorization, of
which naming is a crucial component. Oedipal dynamics can be
adequately characterized by what he calls “the metaphor of the
Name-of-the-Father” (Lacan, 1959–2006, p. 465) or the “paternal
metaphor” (Lacan, 1959–2006, p. 463). To highlight the structure
of the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father Lacan (1959–2006,
p. 465) uses the following formula:
The formula indicates that initially the child has a represen-
tation of what the primordial other (mother) does—she appears
and disappears over and again—but cannot make sense of what
she actually wants. The child has a signifier for the mother, but
no signified for her desire: it is unclear what she wants. The
child first deals with this uncertainty by believing that (s)he is
the central point around which the mother’s desire is turning. In
Lacan’s (1956–1957, 1958) terminology the child is the so-called
“imaginary phallus” for the mother, or the signified of her desire.
This belief entails both primary narcissism and rivalry, which
are transcended by the installment of the Name-of-the-Father. In
the paternal metaphor, the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father
substitutes that of the Mother’s Desire, and leads to the creation
of new signification. The Name-of-the-Father names maternal
desire, expressed by the erasure in the formula. The paternal
signifier comes as a substitute for the maternal signifier and along
this way desire is subjected to the law, i.e., to social and cultural
conventions. The Name-of-the-Father is the signifier of culture
and taboo. By replacing the signifier of maternal desire with the
Name-of-the-Father, maternal desire loses its enigmatic quality:
meanings get attributed to the primordial other’s actions.
A further effect of this naming is that a space for symbolic
identification is created, i.e., a type of identification that is guided
by signifiers and that concerns his/her position toward desire. By
installing the paternal signifier, maternal desire gets framed in
terms of patterns and laws of transaction. Apart fromhermaternal
position the mother also occupies other roles, for example the
position of wife etc., and in addition to her interactions with the
child she is engaged in many other exchange relationships that
the child has nothing to do with. At this stage the observation
that the mother’s desire is not directed solely to the child gives
rise to the question of what organizes maternal desire. The answer
to this question is “the Phallus” or the “symbolic Phallus.” In
Lacan’s (1959–2006) theory the concept of the symbolic Phallus is
a synonym for the ultimate characteristic that makes the object of
maternal desire desirable.With the aim of positioning itself within
the (m)other’s desire, the child will detect these characteristics and
identify with them.
Additionally, Lacan suggests that the Name-of-the-Father
changes the status of the Other for the subject. In his article On a
Question Prior to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis, Lacan gives
quite a specific interpretation to the concept Other, defining it as
“the locus from which the question of his [the subject’s] existence
may arise” (Lacan, 1959–2006, p. 459). The idea is that at the level
of the unconscious each speaking subject is confronted with a
basic question concerning its own identity as subject: “Who am
I?” More precisely this question relates to three issues: one’s “sex,”
one’s “contingency in being” (Lacan, 1959–2006, p. 459), and “the
relational signifiers of love and procreation” (Lacan, 1959–2006,
p. 461). The question of the subject’s sex concerns whether one is
a man or a woman, as well as the issue of how one gives shape to
sexual identity. The matter of contingency in being refers to the
fortuity of life, and to the question what life means in the light of
death. The relational signifiers in their turn point to the question of
what it is that really connects people in love, and to the question of
parenthood. Indeed, in the 1950s Lacan principally discusses the
question of subjectivity in terms of the effect of questions on the
subject. Such questions are thought to be fundamental to human
existence and expressed clinically in symptoms, rather than in
self-conscious questions.
Lacan’s formula of the paternal metaphor indicates that at the
level of the unconscious answers to questions of the existence
of the subject cannot be found. However, the incorporation of
the Name-of-the-Father provides a framework to address these.
Indeed, the Name-of-the-Father provides a symbolic structure to
construct answers to these questions. In principal this is done
via symbolic identification. People answer questions of their own
existence by adopting characteristics they assume make them
desirable to others (phallic traits). This is what the last part of
Lacan’s formula expresses: because of the Name-of-the-Father, the
Phallus is the commondenominator to all questions on the subject
at the level of the Other.
In neurosis the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father replaces
the signifier of maternal desire, such that a dialectical identity
is inaugurated. Incompatible identifications are disagreeable to
the unity-seeking ego and are repressed (Nobus, 2000; Verhaeghe,
2004; Ver Eecke, 2006). In psychosis the situation is different since
the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father remains absent. Lacan
(1959–2006) states: “At the point at which theName-of-the-Father
is summoned: : : a pure and simple hole may thus answer in the
Other” (pp. 465–466). To refer to the absence of the Name-of-the-
Father Lacan uses the concept of foreclosure. The result of such
foreclosure is that the paternal metaphor is not set in motion.
At the level of subjectivity, such non-installment of the Name-
of-the-Father has drastic effects: the articulation of the subject is
rendered chaotic; the subject is not named in relation to maternal
desire; and in relation to questions of existence a gaping hole
remains. Due to foreclosure the questions of existence at the
level of the unconscious—“Who am I?” and “What do you want
from me?”—cannot be addressed in a conventional manner. The
questions that typically lead to the articulation of the subject
do not obtain an answer, which destabilizes the experience of
identity. This implies that the desire of the (m)other remains
fundamentally enigmatic. In psychosis the “code of convention”
that is needed to navigate the enigma of what the other wants is
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absent. The effect is a fundamental difficulty in making sense of
the other’s intentions, as well as in experience a feeling of identity
in relation to questions of the existence of the subject. Indeed, with
respect to personal identity foreclosure implies that a framework
for addressing questions of existence remains lacking. The result is
that there is little to hold on to vis-à-vis one’s identity as aman or a
woman, how to deal with love and sexuality, how to give shape to
intergenerational relationships, or the purpose of life in the light
of death. As a result of foreclosure, questions on the existence of
the subject reveal what Lacan calls “the Real,” that is, the realm of
the radically enigmatic non-signified.
Language Use in Psychosis: Implications
of Lacan’s Foreclosure Theory
While highly conceptual in nature, Lacan’s theory of psychosis
has clear clinical implications, entailing several hypotheses on
the functioning of psychotic patients. Above all, the unconscious
has a different status than in neurosis. Foreclosure, writes Lacan
(1959, p. 465) refers to “a function of the unconscious that is
distinct from the repressed.” Situations in which a person is
confronted with questions on the existence of the subject are
Real. In psychosis these questions don’t give rise to metaphoric
generation of meaning, nor to a feeling of identity. They puz-
zle and overwhelm the psychotic person, and eventually give
rise to decompensation. We believe that with respect to psy-
chotic language use, Lacanian theory entails, at least, three precise
ideas.
A first phenomenon in which the psychotic problem with the
metaphoric generation of meaning might be observed, concerns
the comprehension and actual use of metaphor in speech. Lacan’s
theory does not imply that individuals with psychosis cannot
comprehend or adequately use metaphors at all. Rather, at precise
points, peculiarities in metaphor use and comprehension can be
observed. Indeed, based on Lacanian theory we, on the one hand,
expect that situations in which a person is confronted with the
desire of the other (“what do you want”) and/or the issue of one’s
own existential identity (“who am I”) will entail deficientmetaphor
comprehension: metaphoric meanings implied in other people’s
speech might not be comprehended and a literal interpretation
of figuratively intended speech might stand to the fore. On the
other hand, as speech is actively used in situations related to desire
and existence, we expect deficient metaphor use: metaphors will be
poorly used in defining who one is and how one is positioned in
relation to the other. Both phenomena bear witness to concretism
in language use.
An example can illustrate this. A. is a young woman con-
sulting the second author. She suffers from schizophrenia. One
day her previous therapist told her to “see the world differently,”
and to “look at her relational problems through the eyes of her
boyfriend.” More than a year later she is still confused about
these words. She feels “pressure on her eyes,” which she seems to
experience physically, and she makes fun of her therapist. “I can
only see the world throughmy own eyes: : :what should I look at?”
A. is not affected by the empathy-orientedmeaning implied in her
therapist’s visualmetaphors. They don’t help hermake sense of her
relationship. However, starting from the therapist’s interventions,
she often lingers on the idea of her boyfriend’s eyes: “I sometimes
think: ‘he is only eyes, as if he has no body anymore: : : Can you
marry a pair of eyes?”
A second phenomenon in which the central problem with the
metaphoric generation of meaning is often observed, is autonymic
speech. In line with what classic psychiatrists like Kraepelin,
Bleuler and de Clérambault already stressed, Lacan (1955–1956)
indicates that in psychotic patient’s speech neologisms might be
observed. In such cases “certain words take on a special empha-
sis, a density that sometimes manifests itself in the very form
of the signifier, giving it this frankly neologistic character that
is so striking in the creations of paranoia” (Lacan, 1955–1956,
p. 32).
Several authors have examined the use of neologisms in
schizophrenia and related disorders (McKenna, 2007). In psychi-
atry, a neologism is defined “as a completely new word or phrase
whose derivation cannot be understood” (Andreasen, 1986). Such
an idiosyncratic use of words is present in acutely psychotic
schizophrenic patients, but tends to persist during partial remis-
sion and is unusual in non-schizophrenics (Harrow et al., 1972,
1973). Characteristically, in his discussion of neologisms Lacan
argues that it is more specifically people’s use of language that
should be taken into account. What matters in the neologistic
character of certain words is not so much the question as to
whether they are lexically new or not, but the fact that they
are “autonymous” or self-referential (Lacan, 1959–2006, p. 450).
Lacan characterizes them as “lead in the net” (Lacan, 1955–1956,
p. 33), as immobile “erotized” elements in the network of the
subject’s discourse (Lacan, 1955–1956, pp. 54–55). In other words,
neologisms are a peculiar type of signifier, which present them-
selves as isolated elements that do not enter the referential process
with other signifiers. Lacan concludes that they are the hallmark of
delusions (Lacan, 1955–1956, p. 33–34). In contrast to ametaphor,
autonyms are not the result of a creative move by the speaker, but
words or sentences that were revealed (Lacan, 1955–1956, p. 85).
Autonyms name an otherwise not-nameable reality, and cannot
be brought into dialog with other elements of a person’s speech.
Again, starting from Lacan’s overall psychosis theory, we expect
that the active use of autonymous speech elements will especially
come to the fore in situations in which a person is confronted with
the enigma of the desire of the other (“what do youwant?”) and/or
the issue of one’s own existential identity (“who am I?”). Themore
intense such a confrontation is, the more prevailing autonymous
speech will be.
For example, F. is in his 30s when his first psychotic episode
occurs. After years of traveling around the world F. comes home
to visit his mother, who has a life-threatening disease and no hope
of recovery. One day, as he visits his mother at the intensive care
department, he sees through the window of mother’s room his
father and brother speaking with a physician. Soon thereafter his
mother dies, and F. concludes that on that very day, the “conspir-
acy” began: he believes that his father and bother made a decision
with the physician about hismother’s death. Since that day he is no
longer safe, and became the object of a conspiracy himself. With
the word “conspiracy” F. denotes an element of evil that threatens
to annihilate him. “Conspiracy” nameswhat radically overwhelms
him, but does not signify his position as a subject vis-à-vis his
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relatives and the medical world. In terms of Lacan’s theory, the
signifier “conspiracy” is an autonymous element in F.’s speech.
A third language-use related phenomenon we consider to be
characteristic of psychosis is the dominance of associations at the
level of the signifier over associations at the level of the signified
in daily life contexts. Generally, Lacan assumes that at the level
of the unconscious the signifier is predominant over the signified:
linguistic units are mainly connected because of similarities at the
level of the signifier. At the level of the conscious ego the reverse
is true: language is mainly used to convey ideas. In neurosis,
where the unconscious is repressed, the predominance of the
signifier only comes to the fore in specific phenomena of mental
life: symptoms and so-called productions of the unconscious,
like dreams, jokes and parapraxes. In psychosis, by contrast, the
unconscious is not repressed (Bazan, 2007, 2012). As a result, it
can be expected that in daily life psychotic individuals will be
more strongly inclined to focus on associations between signifiers.
The following example illustrates this. G. is a young English boy
living in Italy. He has suffered from paranoid schizophrenia since
the death of his father, when he was 18 years old. He says that
soon after the death of his father his mother once scolded him for
staying out late all the time, shouting: “come here.” He believes
that these English spoken words actually have a sexual meaning,
and imply that his mother wanted him to ejaculate at home. Both
in Italian than in English, the words “come here” are ambiguous
andmight also refer to ejaculation. In this case the common sense
signified of “come here,” which situates his mother in a punishing
role, could not be heard. What occupies his mind, and cannot be
repressed, is the sexual meaning related to the Italian expression
vieni qui or to the English ‘come/cum. Whereas in neurosis such
sexual meanings would be repressed, they are out in the open
in psychosis. Consequently, G. came to believe that his mother
“wanted him to ejaculate at home.” In line with Lacan’s theory it
might be that the loss of his father brutally confronted G. with the
inability to symbolize the desire of his just-widowed mother. The
catastrophic result of this phenomenon is that the patient came to
interpret the desire of his mother as a sexual desire.
Neuro-Scientific Perspectives on the Role
of Symbolization in Psychosis
From a neurobiological point of view, psychotic disorders are
interpreted in different ways. For example, they have been con-
sidered as the result of a chronic hyperdopaminergic activity
(Cantrup et al., 2012), of a NMDA receptor hypofunction (Coyle,
2012) or of an abnormal brain connectivity (Yang et al., 2014).
The hypofunction of the NMDA receptors has been linked to the
impairment of the synaptic plasticity and of the mechanism of
the long-term potentiation in schizophrenia (Steullet et al., 2006).
Within this neuro-scientific context, Tim Crow is the researcher
who best hypothesized a pivotal involvement of the language
in the onset of psychotic disorders (Crow, 1997). According to
his hypothesis, psychotic symptoms are intrinsic to the human
capacity for language and they represent “language at the end of its
tether” (Crow, 1997), as they provide a window on the transition
between speech and thought (Crow, 1998). More precisely, he
points to a problem relating to hemispheric differentiation: as
a consequence of failed hemispheric differentiation, psychotic
subjects suffer from a loss of the distinction between thought and
speech, and in particular of the distinction between self-generated
messages, and those that he receives as a hearer. Crow (2000)
suggests that in schizophrenia the neural framework necessary to
this distinction is altered.More recently,Magaud et al. (2010) have
reported that individuals at high risk of psychosis have difficulty
in retrieving words in response to categories but not to letters.
Crow et al. (2012) suggested that such category-letter discrep-
ancy is a lead to the pathophysiology of schizophrenia. In his
commentary to the article of Magaud et al. (2010), he postulated
that the phonological engrams are segregated to one (the left)
hemisphere while the primarymeanings are in the opposite hemi-
sphere (more complex associations may be in either hemisphere).
As a consequence of reduced hemispheric differentiation, the
problems of psychosis arise in the connections between phono-
logical (intra-) and semantic (inter-hemispheric) representations,
primarily in the dominant hemisphere (Crow et al., 2012). This
might explain why subjects at high risk of psychosis are more
impaired in the semantic fluency rather than in the phonological
capacity (Magaud et al., 2010; Crow et al., 2012).
The problem with language processing in psychosis may be
evaluated through two different aspects: metaphoric speech and
concretism (Voth and Bradshaw, 1978). In the field of linguistics
it has been suggested that the symptoms of schizophrenia are
evidence of neither a thought disorder nor a syntactic discursive
disorder, but of a semiotic disorder (Harrod, 1986). Semiotics is
the study of signs and symbols; it includes semantics, which con-
cerns the meanings of words and the relations between the words
themselves andwhat theymean. Confusion betweenmetaphorical
and literal use of language and inability to understand “what
is being talked about,” i.e., what the referent of the conversa-
tion is, suggests that schizophrenia might be conceptualized as
a semiotic disorder. Metaphoric and suggestive speech require
symbolic interpretations that go beyond the literal meaning of
words. Therefore, the understanding of metaphor requires the
ability to symbolize, i.e., to use and understand figurative speech.
Concretism represents a common tool for investigating an
individual’s ability to symbolize. It is commonly defined as the
inability to understand the figurative meaning of proverbs and
metaphors (Kircher et al., 2007). However, concretism could be
conceptualized more precisely as having the opposite meaning,
i.e., the practice of representing abstract concepts or qualities in
concrete form. An illustrative example of concretism was already
formulated above in the case of A., who became confused by
the visual metaphors of her therapist. Another example is the
following: M., a 37-year-old schizophrenic patient. In order to
understand what his mother thought (“had in mind”) of him, he
smashed her skull to look inside. In this case, an abstract concept
(“to have in mind”) failed to be understood figuratively, and is
represented in a very concrete form. Another possible explanation
of this example may be provided by the “literalization” hypothesis,
according to which delusions may represent a metaphoric idea
about aspects of the world or the self and are expressed in a
literal way (Elvevåg et al., 2011). This closely connects with Freud’s
(1915) suggestion that in psychosis, figurative meanings are taken
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literally. In the same vein, Rhodes and Jakes (2004) demonstrated
that deficient metaphoric speech might make a contribution to
delusional content. In some individuals it is present before plain
psychotic symptoms come to the fore, when extreme views of
self, others and the world are created. For example, there may
occur a disturbing thought in which a metaphoric expression
describing the self is taken literally, such that it crystallizes new or
previously existing negative emotions and thoughts (Rhodes and
Jakes, 2004).
Studies on Metaphoric Speech Processing
in Psychosis
Impairments in metaphor-processing are commonly observed
in schizophrenia (Mitchell and Crow, 2005, see Table 1 for
an overview of the current literature on this topic). A recent
study demonstrated that compared to control subjects, psy-
chotic patients interpret metaphors more literally (Elvevåg et al.,
2011). Interestingly, it has previously been demonstrated that
schizophrenic patients show reduced priming for literally plausi-
ble idioms but intact priming for literally implausible idioms com-
pared with controls (Titone et al., 2002). Consequently it could be
hypothesized that psychotic patients have fewer difficulties in the
case of literally implausible idioms, i.e., when no other interpreta-
tion of the idiom itself is possible than the literal one. In fact, indi-
viduals with high scores at the Schizotypal Personality Question-
naire (SPQ) and healthy controls do not differ in their ability to
discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate statements,
whether literal or metaphoric (Humphrey et al., 2010). Another
study found that there is no difference between high-schizotypal
adults and low-schizotypal adults in terms of identifying appro-
priate metaphors (Langdon and Coltheart, 2004). Recently, it has
been shown that the interpretation of figurative language, such
as metaphors, does not depend only on semantic and syntactical
decoding but may also require non-linguistic abilities such as
the appreciation of other mental states (e.g., knowledge, inten-
tion, and belief). Furthermore, it may depend on the salience of
idiomatic meaning (familiarity, conventionality, and frequency
of use; Iakimova et al., 2010). Interestingly, however, it does not
depend on IQ (Mo et al., 2008). Although other aspects apart from
the linguistic one may influence the comprehension of non-literal
language, there is considerable evidence that impaired access to
semantic codification plays an important role in schizophrenia.
Interestingly, a recent study has observed a small positive relation
between impairment in metaphor comprehension and negative
symptomatology (Mossaheb et al., 2014). Finally, it is worthy of
note that different studies have provided evidence of impaired
proverb comprehension in schizophrenia (Brüne and Bodenstein,
2005; Thoma et al., 2009; Haas et al., 2014; Rapp et al., 2014).
The Role of the Right Hemisphere in
Metaphoric Speech
Despite the historical and acknowledged dominance of the left
hemisphere in language, researchers have recently focused their
attention on the right hemisphere. In particular, both clinical and
research data (neuroimaging and EEG studies) suggest that the
right hemisphere may play a crucial role in processing figurative
language (Brownell et al., 1990; Rapp, 2009). In line with this, a
recent meta-analysis (Yang, 2012) contends that the right hemi-
sphere is responsible for processing coarse semantic information
in language comprehension. In particular, the right hemisphere
may play an important role in activating broad semantic fields
and integrating concepts that may have distant semantic relations.
The areas mostly involved are the right fronto-temporal regions,
including inferior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, insula,
superior temporal gyrus, andmiddle temporal gyrus (Yang, 2012).
However, right-hemisphere mechanisms may be necessary
but not sufficient, for clarifying patients’ understanding of novel,
low salience metaphoric expressions. The involvement of other
brain areas than the right hemisphere in the comprehension of
novel metaphors has been supported by both studies involving
people with brain damage (Giora et al., 2000; Zaidel et al., 2002)
and healthy adults in neuroimaging studies (Rapp et al., 2004;
Lee and Dapretto, 2006; Stringaris et al., 2007). Recently, fMRI
studies have shown that the process of conventionalization of
novel metaphors causes a specific increase in activity within the
bilateral inferior prefrontal cortex, left posterior middle temporal
gyrus, and right postero-lateral occipital cortex (Schmidt et al.,
2012). According to the graded salience hypothesis (GSH) textual
comprehension is influenced by salience, withmore salient words,
phrases, and sentences being easier to process and requiring less
right-hemisphere recruitment than less salient text (Laurent et al.,
2006).
Right-Hemisphere Dysfunction and
Metaphoric Speech in Psychosis
Several studies have highlighted a dysfunction of the right hemi-
sphere in schizophrenia (Cutting, 1992; Mitchell and Crow,
2005). In particular, right-hemisphere dysfunction is suggested
to be responsible for several psychopathological impairments in
schizophrenia, such as social cognition (de Achával et al., 2012),
abnormal visuospatial perception (Ribolsi et al., 2013), volitional
ocular motor control (Tu et al., 2010), prosodic comprehension
(Mitchell and Crow, 2005), and auditory gating (Hirano et al.,
2010). Furthermore, several studies have investigated the link
between deficient language comprehension and right hemisphere
dysfunction in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia (Kircher
et al., 2002; Mitchell and Crow, 2005; Bleich-Cohen et al., 2009).
In this regard, various studies in schizophrenic subjects document
abnormalities regarding the brain areas involved in the compre-
hension of metaphoric speech. In particular, a severely reduced
asymmetry of the right superior temporal sulcus (STS) at the base
of Heschl’s gyrus has been observed (Chance et al., 2008), and
functional and structural MRI studies have shown a dysfunction
involving the inferior frontal gyrus, the middle frontal gyrus and
the right temporoparietal junction (de Achával et al., 2012).
By contrast, few brain studies have directly examined
metaphoric processing in schizophrenia. Iakimova et al. (2005)
demonstrated that schizophrenic patients exhibit a negative
event related potential (ERP) N400 amplitude for both literal
and metaphoric sentences. The amplitude of the ERP N400
is proportional to the difficulty of interpretation of figurative
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language, and might represent an index of brain activation while
integrating the meaning of a stimulus in an appropriate context
(Debruille, 2007; Lai et al., 2009). These results may suggest
that schizophrenic patients are less efficient in integrating the
semantic context of all sentences (Iakimova et al., 2005). In a
study by Kircher et al. (2007), during the comprehension of
metaphoric vs. literal speech, schizophrenia patients exhibited
less activation than control subjects in the right posterior
temporal cortex. The authors hypothesize that this dysfunction
might underlie the clinical symptom of concretism, reflected in
the impaired understanding of non-literal, semantically complex
language structures. More recently, schizophrenia patients proved
to have reversed lateralization during novel metaphor processing.
In particular, they overactivated the left inferior frontal gyrus,
whereas healthy participants had stronger signal changes in the
right superior/middle temporal gyrus. A possible explanation
of increased BOLD response in some left hemisphere areas is
that patients recruit additional cognitive resources (e.g., working
memory) in order to increase their comprehension of both novel
and conventional metaphors (Mashal et al., 2013). These results
suggest that the inefficient processing of novel metaphors in
schizophrenia involves compensatory recruitment of additional
brain regions than the right ones (Mashal et al., 2013). Finally,
a recent study has explored metaphor-processing in patients
affected by Asperger Syndrome, finding lesser activation of the
right hemisphere during the comprehension of novel metaphors
in these patients than in healthy subjects (Gold and Faust, 2010;
Gold et al., 2010). These data suggest the hypothesis that right
hemisphere-dependent difficulties in figurative language may be
a core feature of autism spectrum disorders as well.
Conclusion
The possibility of explaining psychosis in terms of a severe lack
of symbolization has been supported by several psychoanalytic
authors. Jacques Lacan, in particular, suggests that in psychosis
a specific signifier, which concerns both the law and naming, is
absent and as a result the structure of the Symbolic is unstable.
Lacan calls this signifier the “Name-of-the-Father,” and refers to its
absence with the concept of “foreclosure.” Based on our review of
Lacan’s theory we suggest that language use of psychotic patients
might, at least, be distinctive in three particular ways:
First, psychotic patients are expected to bemore impaired in the
comprehension and actual use of metaphors in speech. In partic-
ular, we expect that in situations in which a person is confronted
with the desire of the other (“what do youwant?”) and/or the issue
of one’s own existential identity (“who am I?”) will entail deficient
metaphor comprehension and deficientmetaphor use. Starting from
Lacanian theory we do not expect a generalized deficiency in
metaphor use, but peculiar metaphor use and concretism when
desire and existence related issues are at stake.
Second, Lacanian theory suggests that psychotic speech is
frequently autonymic, with a rich use of neologisms or auto-
referential words. Neologisms are an unusual type of signifier,
which present themselves as isolated elements that do not enter
the referential process with other signifiers. Again we presume
that the active use of autonymous speech elements will especially
come to the fore in situations in which a person is confronted with
issues related to desire or existence.
A third language-use related phenomenon we consider to be
characteristic of psychosis is the dominance of associations at the
level of the signifier over associations at the level of the signified in
daily life contexts. In psychosis the unconscious is not repressed,
as a result of which drive and jouissance laden topics (e.g., con-
cerning sexuality and destruction) easily come tomind andmight
preoccupy psychotic individuals.
From a neurophysiological point of view, there is evidence
of both structural and functional abnormalities regarding the
brain areas involved in the comprehension of metaphoric speech.
In particular, severely reduced asymmetry of the right superior
temporal sulcus at the base of Heschl’s gyrus has been observed in
schizophrenia (Chance et al., 2008) and furthermore functional
and structural MRI studies have shown a dysfunction involving
the inferior frontal gyrus, the middle frontal gyrus and the right
temporoparietal junction, and the right posterior temporal cortex.
Therefore, although highly speculative, it could be hypothesized
that a dysfunction of the right hemisphere, a brain area strongly
involved in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, may be
associated with the onset of this impairment. Interestingly, some
studies have reported that both senses of an ambiguous word
remain active in the right hemisphere, while the left hemisphere
rapidly suppresses the inappropriate meaning, i.e., the meaning
that should be avoided through common sense (Faust and
Gernsbacher, 1996). A possible hypothesis is that the dysfunction
of the right hemisphere impairs the ability to keep the alternative
senses of figurative speech, with the result of a fixation of one
delusional meaning.
Given the strong focus on comprehension ofmetaphoric speech
in the field of neuro-scientific research we wonder how both fields
of study might converge. Traditionally, psychoanalysis focuses
on the singularity of a case-by-case approach, which enables
contextualized comprehension of specific points in a patient’s
functioning. Neuro-scientific research, in its turn, studies specific
phenomena in samples of subjects, which focuses on generaliza-
tion across individuals, assuming that their contexts will be largely
similar. However, independent of their specific methodologies,
both approaches aim to build general theories on psychosis.
Lacan’s theory aims to guide psychoanalytic praxis with psychosis,
neuro-scientific theory aims to explain the nature of psychosis.
When asking the question of a possible convergence between both
fields of research, these differences at the level ofmethodology and
with respect to the aim and focus of theory should be taken into
account.
Consequently, although highly stimulating, such a convergence
can only be partial as a neuro-scientific translation of a number of
Lacanian concepts, like foreclosure or Name-of-the-Father is not
possible. Such concepts simply don’t fit the requirement of oper-
ationalization that characterizes empirical research. However, the
three aspects of language use that we presume to be characteristic
of psychosis could be tested within empirical research designs,
and might well connect with current neuro-scientific research
paradigms.
From our discussion of the current neuro-scientific
literature, it emerges that several studies have investigated
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the processing of metaphoric speech in schizophrenia. Although
far from conclusive, the available evidence suggests that
schizophrenia patients are more impaired in the interpretation of
metaphors than controls. Presuming that at this level peculiarities
can be observed, we believe that the Lacanian focus on desire
and existence-related issues might well be taken into account
when studying metaphor use and comprehension. Such an
investigation may not only validate Lacanian insight, but also
refine neuro-scientific predictions.
Moreover, the current neuro-scientific literature has con-
firmed the increased use of neologisms as a fundamental
marker of language-use in psychosis (Jampala et al., 1989).
These are strongly and specifically associated with grammati-
cal–phonological encoding performance (Barch and Berenbaum,
1996). For example, in the Scale for the Assessment of Thought,
Language, andCommunication (Andreasen andGrove, 1986), the
amount of neologisms during the interview with the psychotic
patient is one of the items that should be evaluated from the
clinician to assess formal thought disorders. Yet, from a Lacanian
point of view, the study of neologisms should not strictly focus
on newly created words, but also pay attention to highly private
interpretations of existing words, and again pay attention to the
desire and existence-related experiential contexts in which these
are produced.
Concerning the dominance of associations at the level of the
signifier over associations at the level of the signified, in this
manuscript we reported a clinical case (the case of G.) that may
represent a common example of this phenomenon. Interestingly,
there is some evidence that individuals at high risk of psychosis
have difficulty in retrieving words in response to categories but
not to letters and aremore impaired in the semantic fluency rather
than in the phonological capacity (Magaud et al., 2010). To this
regard Crow et al. (2012) postulated that psychosis may arise
from an abnormal connection between phonological (intra-) and
semantic (inter-hemispheric) representations, as a consequence
of reduced hemispheric differentiation. However, specific neuro-
scientific investigations still lack on this aspect. In line with the
case of G. we suggest taking into account the precise life context
within which the dominance of associations at the level of the
signifier come to the fore. Building on the Lacanian concept of the
unconscious we presume that especially speech and thought about
drive and jouissance related topics will bring this predominance to
the fore.
Conversely we can ask the question as to how neuro-scientific
research might inspire Lacanian psychoanalysis. Neuro-scientific
studies suggest that right-hemisphere dysfunction is responsible
for both problems in figurative speech comprehension and
other psychopathological including social cognition, abnormal
visuospatial perception, volitional ocular motor control, prosodic
comprehension, and auditory gating. In psychoanalytic clinical
work, attention might be paid to the question as to if and how
dysfunctions in these domains cohere in patients’ experiences
and functioning. Furthermore, the observation that metaphor
comprehension is affected in Asperger syndrome, just like in
schizophrenia, might stimulate contemporary Lacanian analysts
to further work on the question of autism in relation to psychotic
structure, focusing on specific language use patterns (Maleval,
2009).
However, the convergence between Lacanian psychoanalysis
and neuroscience has its limits. For example, in his study of psy-
chopathology Lacan strongly stresses psychical causality, meaning
that processes of identification and ways in which the signi-
fier is used in relation to the Other determine psychopathol-
ogy (Lacan, 1947–2006, 1966–2006). Neuroscientists, by contrast,
usually stress biological mechanisms at the basis of psychosis. At
this point convergence is difficult. Lacan was interested in the
structure of mental phenomena biological psychiatrists like de
Clérambault described, but with respect to the crucial determin-
ing factors diverged from them in stressing subjective processes
and structures instead of biological bases.
To conclude, there are, first of all, some “diagnostic” implica-
tions that might be drawn from this study. Current nosographic
systems substantially neglect peculiarities of language use in psy-
chosis. For example, the criteria of schizophrenia from DSM-5
do not take in account the processing figurative language, but
only focus on “disorganized speech.” Therefore we consider the
question of language use, and of metaphor use in particular, as
the forgotten dimension in psychosis, suggesting that it should be
more central to the diagnosis of psychosis. Second, it could be
interesting to examine how peculiarities in language use change
during the course of the psychotic episodes. For example, it
would be extremely interesting to investigate if such impairment
is already present before and during the first episode of psy-
chosis, or whether it appears only later after the onset of the
disorder. Finally, there are some implications for the treatment.
It would be very interesting to evaluate the changeability of this
phenomenon, and to examine if and how both pharmacological
and psychological treatments have an effect on language use in
psychosis.
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